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ABSTRACT: Reading different or controversial intentions into 
Marx and Engels’ works has been somewhat a common but rather 
unquestioned practice in the history of Marxist scholarship. Engels’ 
Dialectics of Nature, a torso for some and a great book for others, is a 
case in point. A bold line seems to shape the entire Engels debate 
and separate two opposite views in this regard: Engels the contami-
nator of Marx’s materialism vs. Engels the self-started genius of 
dialectical materialism. What Engels, unlike Marx, has not enjoyed 
so far is a critical reflection upon the relationship between different 
layers of this text: authorial, textual, editorial and interpretational. 
Informed by a historical hermeneutic, inquiry into the elements 
that structure the debate on “Dialectics of Nature,” and into the 
different political and philosophical functions attached to it, makes 
it possible to relocate the meaning of “dialectics” in a more precise 
context. Engels’ dialectics is less complete than we usually think it 
is, but he achieved more than most scholars would like to admit.
KEYWORDS: Engels, dialectics of nature, MEGA, philosophy, 
natural science
IT IS NOT VERY UNUSUAL in the history of Marxism that schol-arly debates turn into battlefields. The reception history of Engels’ Dialectics of Nature in the 20th century seems to be such a case. 
In fact, I am not aware of any other work that has been subject to as 
much conflict and chaos in Marxist scholarship. If there were a count 
of attacks, it is very likely that Engels would win. Engels critique, in 
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particular critique of Dialectics of Nature, has a history for almost a 
century, and I doubt that it will end soon.
Engels has been charged by a series of scholars with metaphysics, 
dogmatism, eclecticism, positivism, etc. We are told that dialectics of 
nature is Engels’ own invention, and that it should be distinguished 
from Marx’s social scientific enterprise. This sharp contrast between 
Marx and Engels, and accusations against Engels’ alleged flaws, were 
then opposed by another group of scholars. The latter hold that what-
ever stands and falls with materialist dialectics is not an invention of 
Engels but a product of Marx and Engels’ collaboration. Accordingly, 
Marx and Engels do not fall apart but rather complement each other 
with regards to dialectics of nature.
Engels’ critics believed that we should simply drop this idea and 
move on. Engels’ supporters, by contrast, typically opposed this ten-
dency. The old debate thus clustered around an extremely narrow 
question of whether Engels earned his place in Marxism or not.1 
Subsequently, Marx scholarship turned into a quotology wherein the 
circumstantial textual evidence wins the argument.
From today’s vantage point, one might rightfully expect that such 
concerns as Marx’s alleged (dis)approval of Engels’ application of 
dialectics should have come down to more fundamental questions: 
How to understand Engels’ dialectics in its own right, in the text as 
he has written it? What were his intentions and goals? What did he 
achieve and where did he fail?
These questions hardly need justification, for if application of dia-
lectics to nature is the central issue here, the definition of dialectics and 
its relation to opposition and contradiction are binding. The difficulty 
is not that Engels did not define or use these key words in a systematic 
manner, but that he was at times inconclusive or ambiguous. Through-
out the years, his intentions were changing as he was setting different 
problems for himself and speaking to different audiences. These inten-
tions deserve a reconsideration without anyone else giving voice to him, 
or speaking on his behalf. Thus, what Marx would have said of Engels’ 
dialectics is less decisive than one might usually think in this regard.
1 My coinage of the term “the Engels debate” might be misleading, for Engels’ texts have 
been discussed in a variety of ways in various (Soviet, German or Chinese) traditions. Here 
I simply refer to the criticism of Engels’ attempted application of dialectics to nature and 
direct responses to it. In what follows, I will be able to summarize only a small number of 
the diverse positions involved in the Engels controversy.
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That the past scholarship tended to ignore Engels’ incomplete 
intentions or failed achievements is evident from the chronicle of the 
Engels debate. For it was never only about Engels’ science; his intel-
lectual prestige and political authority were at stake. Challenging or 
defending him was, and still is, ideologically motivated, though that 
motivation sometimes led scientific argument to accusation and insult. 
Dismissive attacks rather than reasoned arguments shaped much of the 
polemical framework in this literature. Its ultimate result was that dif-
ferent, indeed conflicting and controversial, meanings were attached 
to Engels’ text that are not necessarily there. Present interpretations 
were often projected into a past text, though this put at risk a clear 
distinction between author’s intentions, his text and its subsequent 
readings. A by-product of this fallacy to which it contributed in turn 
is the editorial aspect of the text. In its 60 years of publication history 
(1925–1985), Engels’ text has been presented and read differently. 
With each different title selection and manuscript arrangement in 
subsequent editions of the book, the audience met, and was supposed 
to meet, a different Engels. Invariably, however, a completeness and 
maturity of his dialectics was always imposed.
In this inquiry, I will first revisit the old debate and the editorial his-
tory that accompanied it. I will then undertake a philological analysis of 
Engels’ philosophical terminology in Dialectics of Nature and Anti-Dühring. 
This will show that 1) Engels’ treatment of, and emphasis on, dialectics 
is heterogeneously distributed in various stages of his project; 2) Anti-
Dühring develops a more systematic case for dialectics of nature than 
the Dialectics of Nature itself; 3) Engels shifts his focus from philosophical 
dialectics to natural-scientific theories of motion in the post–Anti-Dühring 
period; and 4) his historical references to past dialectical philosophies 
(Aristotle, Kant, Hegel) are too sketchy and inconclusive. Regarding 
the last point, he remains silent when it comes to alternative configura-
tions of dialectics, contradiction and opposition. He takes it for granted 
that they are necessarily connected. His references, by contrast, lead to 
other conclusions. For example, contradiction can be logical without 
being dialectical (Aristotle); opposites can be dialectical without being 
real (Kant); opposites are dialectical, but contradictions are speculative 
(Hegel). Needless to say, alternative organizations of these concepts can 
lead to different understandings of a dialectics of nature.
Engels was probably not oblivious to such problems and he 
expressed, implicitly or explicitly, a need for a fuller historical and 
G4712.indd   217 3/1/2019   2:16:05 PM
218 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
systematic approach. Nevertheless, such intentions remained largely 
incomplete, an aspect which most participants in the Engels debate 
hardly take seriously. The present article suggests a re-reading of 
Engels that takes both Engels’ accomplishments and unresolved issues 
into account.
The Engels Debate
Lukács is probably the first scholar who viewed the application of 
dialectics to nature as a problem. He argues that Engels was “follow-
ing Hegel’s mistaken lead” by extending “the [dialectical] method to 
apply also to nature” (1971, 24).2 Dialectics, however, is “limited . . . to 
the realms of history and society.” Unsurprisingly, the “methodology 
of natural sciences . . . rejects the idea of contradiction and antago-
nism in its subject matter” (Lukács, 1971, 10; 1977, 175). Social reality 
and social sciences, by contrast, necessarily involve contradiction and 
antagonism (ibid., 181–2). “Theory,” unlike natural science, reveals 
“real tendencies of processes of social development” and opens up 
the way to “overcoming” and “removing” these contradictions (ibid.).3
Deborin (1924, 69) ridicules Lukács’ attempt to lecture Engels 
about dialectics and charges his defense of Marxism against Engels 
with “dualism.” He is an “idealist as far as his account of nature is 
concerned, but a dialectical materialist with regards to social historical 
reality” (ibid., 51). “From the point of view of dialectical materialism, 
nature itself is dialectical. And to this extent, our knowledge of nature 
is dialectical.” Idealists such as Lukács “are apparently not capable 
of grasping the objective character of dialectical processes in nature 
and history” (ibid., 58–9).
Following the publication of the first edition of Dialectics of Nature 
in 1925,4 I. I. Stepanov (1925, 60), a prominent Soviet Mechanist, 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
3 Two years later, Lukács (2000, 93; 1999, 121) will be defending himself against his opponents 
by claiming that it is “the development of science that drums the dialectic into the natural sci-
entists.” “Self-evidently the dialectic could not possibly be effective as an objective principle of 
development of society, if it were not already effective as a principle of development of nature 
before society, if it did not already objectively exist” (Lukács, 2000, 102; 1999, 128). Also note 
here the English mistranslation of the chapter title “Dialektik in der Natur” (Dialectics in 
Nature) as “Dialectics of Nature” (2000, 94; 1999, 114).
4 John Bellamy Foster (2000, 229) wrongly dates the first edition back to 1927. Levine (2006, 
3) is mistaken in asserting that it was “printed in the Soviet Union in full in 1927.” The 
complete version was published by MEGA2 in 1985 in East Germany.
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divides Engels’ view on nature into Hegelian nature-philosophical and 
scientific-materialist phases, evolving from the former to the latter. 
That “Engels the dialectician” becomes later “Engels the mechanist,” 
Deborin (1925, 10, 17) protests, is Stepanov’s imagination. Engels, 
early and late, is simply at pains to develop “a dialectical understand-
ing of natural processes” or “dialectics of natural sciences.”
Commenting on the 1939–1941 edition, Sartre goes on to say 
that Engels’ dialectics of nature is an “absolute principle” or “a priori 
and without justification,” that is, it is “not open to verification at all” 
(Sartre, 2004, 27–8). Accordingly, “dialectic moves in the opposite 
direction from science” (Sartre, 1947, 165).5 Later commentators 
fashioned a similar criticism. The “attempt to apply the dialectic to 
nature must be ruled out as incompatible with a naturalistic starting 
point. Marx himself never speaks of a Natur-Dialektik” (Hook, 1962, 
75). Marx’s dialectics “expresses the logic of historical consciousness 
and class action.” Nature is “relevant to dialectic only when there is 
an implied reference to the way in which it conditions social and his-
torical activity” (ibid., 76). Engels’ dialectics is an “eclectic composite 
of Marx’s naturalism, Hegel’s logic and contemporary positivism” 
(Lichtheim, 1972, 212). “There can be no question of a dialectic of 
external nature” because material reality is “always socially mediated” 
(Lewis, 1972, 65). All this mess goes back to “August 1859 [when] 
Friedrich Engels invented dialectics, the progenitor of unresolvable 
ambiguities within the Marxist tradition” (Carver, 1983, 117).6
The opposite camp can be called Leninist in the sense that Engels’ 
dialectics is seen to be “in full conformity” with Marx’s materialist philos-
ophy (Lenin, 1974, 51). Dialectics of nature is “no invention of Engels.” 
On the contrary, “it was worked out in collaboration with Marx and had 
his full agreement” (Hoffman, 1975, 56). Those who separate Marx 
5 For further commentary on this debate see Merleau-Ponty, 1947, 173; Gretskii, 1964; Schmidt, 
1965; Novack, 1996, 231–55; and Remley, 2012.
6 These views are repeated over and over again by Lichtheim, 1964, 246; Jordan, 1967; Colletti, 
1973, 46; Avineri, 1975, 70; Levine, 1975, 145; Gunn, 1977, 46; Rayner, 1977, 154; Attenbor-
ough, 1978, 31; Kołakowski, 1978, 379; Carver, 1980, 360; Schmidt, 1993, 55–6; Althusser, 
2005, 121–122; Paolucci, 2007, 245; Carchedi, 2011, 37–8; Carchedi, 2012, 547. For more 
detail also see Rigby, 2007, 103–108, and Sheehan, 1993, 53–60. The British debate was 
closely followed by Chinese scholars (see Dai, 1978), but a critical assessment of the Engels 
controversy here or elsewhere is usually not visible. In more recent Chinese literature on 
dialectics of nature, a non-problematic Marx–Engels relation is rather monolithically taken 
for granted (see Hu, 2006; Wu, 2014; Xiao, et al., 2016). Hu Daping’s monography of En-
gels (2011, 492–506) and Zhou Lindong’s thorough discussion (Zhou, 2001) are notable 
exceptions.
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from Engels falsify the fact that Marx actually endorsed Engels’ natural 
dialectics. He “took a strong interest in science and regarded a dialec-
tics of nature as essential to his theory of a unified science” (Stanley 
and Zimmermann, 1984, 226). No true scholarship but a hidden anti-
communism is behind those who come up with charges against Engels 
and separate him from Marx (Oiserman, 1978, 44–45).7
The alleged contamination of Marx’s work by Engels is usually 
resisted by appeals to textual authority such as Marx’s contribution 
to Anti-Dühring or the Marx–Engels correspondence. While Leninists 
might have been well aware of the need for a closer consideration of 
alternative positions, they were rather alerted by, and directly respond-
ing to, a scapegoat mechanism operated by their counterparts. What 
both sides have in common is that they both argue that there is only 
one single right interpretation of Engels: their own. They just disagree 
on the question of whether a satisfying answer to the problem of 
Engels’ dialectics can be given by an authentic Marx freed from Engels. 
There is either Marx and Engels, or Marx against Engels. Engels’ dia-
lectics either belongs to the canons of Marxism, or not.
My problem with these sorts of readings is that, when claiming 
authority for the proper reading of Engels, both views rule out the 
possibility of another perspective that insists upon understanding 
Engels in his own right in the text as he has written it. Certainly, 
any reading occurs from a present vantage point, and it is done for 
present purposes, political or otherwise. But this cannot mean that 
we can ascribe to Engels’ text any value or meaning we wish, such 
as systematicity or completeness. B. M. Kedrov (1971), for instance, 
does this by calling it “Engels’ Great Book.” The problem is not that 
it was not great; rather, that it was not a book. It rather became a book, 
posthumously, through subsequent editions of Dialectics of Nature. In 
the next section, I will spend some time on the history of this “book” 
and the meanings that are attached to it.
Creation of a Book: “Dialectics of Nature”
The first piece of text (“The Part Played by Labor in the Transition 
from Ape to Man”) from what came to be known later as Dialectics of 
7 For the Leninist line, also see Timpanaro, 1975, 74; Gray, 1977; Greaves, 1977; Hoffman, 1977; 
Rayner, 1977; Torbe, 1977; Korch, 1978; Cohen, 1980; Moran, 1980; Levins and Lewontin, 
1985, 279; Sève, 1992; Stanley, 2002; Holz, 2005; Weston, 2012; Altvater, 2015, 36; Kangal, 2017.
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Nature was published by Eduard Bernstein, one of the German Social 
Democratic leaders (SPD) and an executor of the literary estate of 
Marx and Engels, in 1895–96. This was followed by “Natural Science 
in the Spirit World” in 1898. A majority of the Marx–Engels correspon-
dence relevant to the later Engels debate was edited and published by 
Bernstein in 1913, as well. The SPD also entrusted German physicist 
Leo Arons with the task of assessing whether Engels’ manuscripts on 
dialectics of nature were worth publishing. Arons came to a negative 
assessment, claiming Engels’ works are outdated (Griese, et al., 1985, 
594–5; Griese and Pawelzig, 1995).8 Several years later, Bernstein asked 
Albert Einstein’s opinion. Einstein (2015, 414) believed that the manu-
scripts have no merits from the perspective of contemporary physics, 
but they give interesting insights into Engels’ intellectual biography. 
In the 1920s, David Riazanov, Director of the Marx–Engels Institute 
in Moscow and chief editor of the historical–critical edition of the 
Marx–Engels Collected Works (MEGA), borrowed the manuscripts from 
Bernstein and copied them all in 1923.
Dialectics of Nature was published first in 1925 in the German 
original and Russian translation, under the titles “Naturdialektik” and 
“Dialektika Prirody” (Dialectics of Nature).9 It included most of the 
manuscripts, except some formulas, calculations and the “1878 Plan.” 
In a 1927 edition, the title was changed to “Dialektik und Natur” (Dia-
lectics and Nature). This edition, unlike the previous one, included 
“Preparatory Works for Anti-Dühring,” but omitted the fragment 
“Transition from Ape to Man.” In both editions, manuscripts were 
published according to chronological order. This was then repro-
duced in the 1929 and 1931 Russian editions. A new German edition 
was prepared in 1935, with corrected decipherments of the manu-
scripts and additional remarks on the texts. This time it included 
the “1878 Plan” and “Motion of Planetary Bodies” in it, but omitted 
“Slavery, Fourier, Concerning the Value of an Object.” A newer Rus-
sian edition (1939–1941) switched the title back to Dialektika Prirody 
(Dialectics of Nature). This put both “1878 Plan” and “Dialectics” in 
8 Arons’ negative decision, Bernstein speculates, might originate from the former’s sympathy 
for empiricism and distaste for dialectics (Griese, et al., 1985, 596).
9 Note here that “Naturdialektik” and “Dialektik der Natur” are different formulations, even 
if there is no obvious difference in terms of their meaning. Russian or English do not follow 
this difference (“Dialectics of Nature” or “Dialektika Prirody”). At that time, they were not 
published in MEGA but first in Russian and German in the Marx-Engels Archive, then as a 
special edition (Sonderausgabe), as in 1935.
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the very beginning, followed by “Articles and Chapters,” indicating 
that Engels’ natural scientific studies illustrate a certain number of 
dialectical laws or axioms. This edition also served as the textual basis 
for all the subsequent editions in Russian, German and English, etc. 
(Griese, et al., 1985, 597–8).10
The latest version appeared in MEGA in 1985, with both chrono-
logical and systematic order. Unlike previous versions, this edition 
consisted of everything transmitted from Engels via Bernstein to Riaza-
nov, without any omissions. Nevertheless, it is curious that one volume 
presents two different versions of the same text. The decision for a 
bi-versioned edition goes back to a discussion between Russian and 
German editors in the 1980s. A systematic order of the manuscripts 
was against the editorial principles of the historical–critical edition. 
But the former version, unlike the latter one, presents “the logical 
structure of the work” much better (Griese and Pawelzig, 1995, 56). 
The debate ended with the compromise of publishing both versions.
All the editors listed above saw their task as establishing a version 
of the text which is as authentic as possible in the sense that their 
arrangement of manuscripts and the specific choices they make of a 
certain version reflect the author’s final and binding intention. Edi-
tors’ judgments naturally depend on their image of the author. And 
the way they evaluate author’s work determines how they decide to 
present it. In Engels’ case, however, their professional role was not 
limited to being a middleman between the author and his readers. 
They were supposed to take into account the political–philosophical 
concerns of Marxism, Engels’ role in it and the proper presentation 
form of Engels’ text that does address such issues. In other words, they 
were partially in charge of how Dialectics of Nature  should function in 
the context of Marxism.
The earliest example of this is of course the first edition. Lukács’ 
challenge to Engels and Marx’s alleged disagreement with him was 
reflected in the titles given to the book. Interestingly, Luppol (1930, 
171) claimed in 1925 that the publication of the book would put an 
end to the debate. Naturally, this never happened. The chronological 
10 There are also Kedrov’s less known Russian–German editions (1973–79). Kedrov called them 
“Friedrich Engels on Dialectics of Natural Science.” The title and manuscript arrangement 
suggest that Engels’ enterprise is not really about a dialectical ontology of nature but an 
epistemology of natural sciences. This view gave rise much later to another debate in Ger-
many on “dialectics of nature” vs. “dialectics of natural science” (see Holz, 2005, 552–556).
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order, to name an example, was used by Stepanov for an unexpected 
division between early and late Engels. The systematical order of the 
later editions that opens with Engels’ two plans and nature-scientific 
material subordinated to them, by contrast, not only aimed to avoid 
similar interpretations but also to make the book more accessible to 
a wider public. What the editors certainly did not predict was that 
Engels’ dialectical laws would be subject to another controversy, as 
in the French debate.
As far as the editors’ role in these quarrels is concerned, there 
is at least one unmistakable tension here. It is the gap between the 
editor as advocate or executor of the author’s will and the editor who 
reads, comments on and presents the text in the interest of readers, 
so that they read Engels’ text as it is decreed to mean. Now this has to 
do not only with adding authority and status, or assigning a function, 
to Engels’ text. When polishing and resituating the book in a newer 
political intellectual setting, the editors also reconstruct an idea which 
they believe is behind that work.
This idea, which the editors, following Engels, called “Dialectics 
and/of Nature/Natural Science,” assumes the accuracy and clarity of 
Engels’ terminology. I doubt this is entirely true. Engels certainly gives 
clues about his general tasks and problems in various places in the 
text, though they are usually too sketchy. A historical–critical account 
of the term “dialectics,” in relation to previous understandings, is a 
case in point. Two other equally important terms that belong to the 
same body of thinking — opposition and contradiction — suffer from 
the same problem. In what follows, I will examine Engels’ understand-
ing of, and references to, dialectics and anything related to it in the 
text, and speculate about possible scenarios of a fuller account in this 
regard. This will clarify the difference between what he says in the 
text and how he is interpreted in the later readings.
Engels’ Dialectics in the Text
When Engels might have first launched his project and when he 
ended it is a mystery. For some, Dialectics of Nature goes back to the 
1840s or 50s (Kedrov, 1979, 443).11 Others believe it starts in 1873 with 
11 Kedrov ambiguously speaks of a single “Manchester time.” This is misleading, for Engels 
had at least two (1840s and 1850s) Manchester periods.
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the earliest manuscript of the book (Gemkow, 1988, 447). According 
to a third approach (Liedman, 1986, 99), it starts in July 1858 when 
Engels (1978, 337–8) asks Marx to send him a copy of Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Nature, emphasizing its promising potential for chemistry, 
biology and physiology. More often than not, Engels’ engagement in 
Anti-Dühring  between 1876 and 1878 is seen as a break, after which he 
returns to his initial plan, which is interrupted again by Marx’s death 
and the edition of volumes II and III of Capital. Regarding the end of 
the project, we are offered two alternatives: it is either Marx’s death in 
1883 or Engels’ death in 1895. Ordinarily, it is hard to determine an 
exact time span for Engels’ work in this context, for it can be argued 
that even the young Engels’ studies of natural sciences and dialectics 
gave rise to Dialectics of Nature, a terrain which he never leaves.
Nevertheless, 197 manuscript fragments, which Engels put in four 
folders — naming them “Dialectics and Natural Science,” “Natural 
Research and Dialectics,” “Dialectics of Nature,” and “Mathematics 
and Natural Science” — are the textual material transmitted to Riaza-
nov (Griese, et al., 1985, 570). The earliest text in those folders is 
Engels’ critical study of Büchner’s mechanical materialism from Febru-
ary 1873, and the latest one is an unpublished fragment (beginning 
of 1886) from his late article on Feuerbach (ibid., 599 and 607). As 
in the latter case, it is hard to call other works, such as Anti-Dühring, 
“breaks” from this project. Besides the fact that the content of Feuer-
bach, Anti-Dühring and Socialism are closely connected to Dialectics of 
Nature, Engels wrote more than 60 manuscripts of Dialectics of Nature 
in the period 1876–78. Also note that the “Old Preface on Dühring. 
On Dialectics” found a place in the folder “Natural Research and 
Dialectics” (ibid., 606). If Anti-Dühring was really a “break,” one ought 
to use the term in a very loose sense.
As for dialectics, Anti-Dühring is especially interesting because 
nowhere else does Engels address the questions of dialectics in such 
a systematic manner. It can even be argued that Anti-Dühring builds 
a much stronger case for dialectics of nature than Dialectics of Nature 
itself. Although past scholarship often takes them as if they are one 
and the same text, Engels seems to be speaking to different audi-
ences in them. While the chapters in Anti-Dühring  on philosophy, 
nature and dialectics attempt to justify the existence of real contradic-
tions in nature and society, the gist of Dialectics of Nature, especially its 
late stages, is about universal structures and the history of motion in 
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nature. If the postulated reader of Anti-Dühring  is Dühring himself and 
his supporters, Dialectics of Nature speaks primarily to natural scientists 
and to a wider public puzzled by the challenges of contemporary natu-
ral sciences to old-fashioned dialectical philosophy. In other words, 
Dialectics of Nature is more about nature and less about dialectics, and I 
think this is a problem. If Engels thought that his account of dialectics 
in Anti-Dühring  is satisfying enough so that he can invest more energy 
into the analysis of structures and the history of motion in nature, 
then I would ask how this conviction is justified and to what extent. 
A closer examination of Engels’ dialectical terminology in both texts 
will be illuminating in this regard.
Dialectics in Anti-Dühring
Eugen von Dühring, a professor at Berlin University and an influ-
ential intellectual in SPD circles, caught Engels’ attention first with 
his critical review of Marx’s Capital which Engels (1974, 8) reports to 
Marx in January 1868. In his reply, Marx (1974a, 9) writes that Dühring 
misunderstood many things, including his dialectics and its distinc-
tion from that of Hegel.12 Marx (1974b, 18) calls him ironically “a 
great philosopher,” for “he wrote a ‘Natural Dialectics’ against Hegel’s 
‘unnatural’ one.” Dühring’s massive publications in the following years 
and his persistent criticism of Hegelian dialectics were perceived in 
socialist circles as the rise of a new rival of Marx. In 1875, Wilhelm 
Liebknecht encourages Engels to write a response. It is evident from 
a May 1876 letter to Marx that Engels (1966, 12) was tempted by 
Dühring’s renewed attacks. A counter-attack was inevitable.
According to Dühring (1873, 452), Marx’s Capital is written in a 
fully Hegelian spirit. Marx not only adopts Hegel’s dialectical catego-
ries in the exact same order and applies them to the critique of politi-
cal economy but also repeats the same mistake of Hegelian dialectics. 
This flaw, so the argument goes, is the so-called principle of contra-
diction. Contradictions are actually “absurdities” of logic (ibid., 445). 
Hegel’s idealism, however, confuses concepts with reality and projects 
the notion of contradiction into the real world (Dühring, 1875, 30). 
There is no such thing as a “real contradiction” (realer Widerspruch) 
(ibid., 32). Contrary to this “arabesque” “unlogic” (Dühring, 1873, 
12 Marx repeats this view in his March 1868 letter to Kugelmann (Marx, 1974c, 538).
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446, 453), Dühring (1865, 113) offers a “Natural Dialectics” (Natürliche 
Dialektik) that adopts another structural core unit: unity of opposites. 
Interrelation and interpenetration of mechanical forces in nature are 
“real opposites.” Real opposites are “antagonisms” (Antagonismus) or 
“conflicts” (Widerstreit) (Dühring, 1875, 31).
In his response, Engels argues that Dühring explains the problem 
away by calling real contradictions “antagonisms.” Engels not only 
elaborates this claim but also distinguishes three types of contradic-
tions which might be called 1) contradictions in nature, 2) contradic-
tion as theoretical inconsistency, and 3) contradictions inherent to any 
scientific theory. The basic tenet of the first type is a list of elaborated 
examples of real opposites in nature such as necessity and coincidence, 
interaction of opposite physical forces or cause and effect. He famously 
claims that “motion itself is contradiction” (Engels, 1988, 318). The 
second type is called “absurd contradiction” (ibid., 257). This is close 
to Dühring’s usage of the term, but Engels directs it against Dühring’s 
flaws. The third type is located between mankind’s attempt “to gain an 
exhaustive knowledge of the world system in all its interrelations” and 
its inevitable failure to completely fulfill this task (ibid., 245). We have 
to do with a contradiction between humanity’s potentially unlimited 
capacity for knowledge and its biological, physical or cognitive limi-
tations in single individuals (ibid., 288). This contradiction finds its 
solution “in the endless progressive development of humanity” (ibid., 
245) and in “an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress” 
(ibid., 319) of knowledge “from known to unknown” (ibid., 330).
Following this threefold division of contradiction, Engels offers 
three compatible definitions of dialectics: dialectics as 1) contradic-
tory structures in nature, 2) a certain method of thinking, and 3) a 
holistic theory of totality. As for the first definition, he writes that 
“the kernel of dialectical conception of nature” is the recognition 
of “opposites and differences” (Gegensätze und Unterschiede) in nature 
(ibid., 497). Any process is by its nature “antagonistic” (antagonistisch), 
that is, it contains a “contradiction” (Widerspruch) or “transformation 
of one extreme into its opposite” (Umschlagen eines Extrems in sein 
Gegenteil) (ibid., 335). This is the real foundation of what he calls a 
“method of thinking” (Denkmethode) (ibid., 233) that operates “within 
polar opposites” (in polaren Gegensätzen) (ibid., 292). However, it “does 
not build dialectical laws into nature but discovers them in it” (ibid., 
495). This leads to the third definition: “dialectics is . . . the science of 
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general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and 
thought” (ibid., 336). In other words, unity of contradictory opposites 
is an elementary and universal structure present in nature, society 
and thought. In each of these spheres of reality, it takes a different 
form and it is treated differently from different aspects of dialectics.
Dialectics in Dialectics of Nature
From the angle of Anti-Dühring  (1876–78), it is clear that much 
of Engels’ dialectical fire is transferred from the 1873–76 period. The 
term “contradiction” reaches its peak in Anti-Dühring, to say the least. 
As for the contrast between different periods, all aforementioned types 
of contradiction are used in the pre–Anti-Dühring period, though less 
frequently. Real contradictions are openly called contradictions here, 
but after Anti-Dühring (1878–86) the term is almost always mentioned 
in the sense of theoretical inconsistency. The only exception is the 
“1878 Plan.” This he revises in 1880 and then drops the term.
In a way, such a slippage in the very late stage of his work leaves 
the impression that Anti-Dühring absorbed much of what Engels could 
have said about dialectics and contradiction. Once it is clear in the eye 
of the reader, he may have thought, that motion is contradiction and 
everything is in motion, then the puzzle of dialectics is solved. Also 
note here that the keyword of the post–Anti-Dühring period, especially 
in the “1880 Plan,” is not dialectics or contradiction but motion (in 
nature, society and thought).
Let me start with real contradictions. They are explicitly mentioned 
only three times in Dialectics of Nature. The first occasion (November 
1875) is when he speaks of Newton’s physics and its analysis of plan-
etary motion. The relation between attraction of the Sun and the 
so-called tangential-force “run into a contradiction” (Engels, 1985, 
45). It appears for a second time (October–November 1877) in his 
characterization of the relation between necessity and coincidence 
(ibid., 137). This is combined with contradiction in the sense of theo-
retical inconsistency when he charges metaphysics with ignoring the 
existence of real contradictions. Finally, the term shows up in his “1878 
Plan” (August–September 1878) as one of the laws of dialectics: “devel-
opment through contradiction or negation of negation” (ibid., 173). 
In the sense of theoretical inconsistency, the term sometimes 
(November 1875–May 1876) refers to a “contradiction” within the 
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anti-evolutionary world view, according to which the earth does change 
but the living organisms on it do not (ibid., 76). Elsewhere (October–
November 1877), Engels argues that Hegel’s view on coincidence 
and necessity is viewed by natural sciences as a “paradoxical language 
game” (paradoxe Sprachspielerei) or “self-contradictory nonsense” (sich 
selbst widersprechender Unsinn) (ibid., 139). Other examples, such as 
contradictions between claims and natural laws (February–July 1880) 
or contradictions as errors (January–August 1882), are also present 
(ibid., 190, 259).
There is also a gradually decreasing emphasis on the existence 
of real opposites from the early to late stages of the work. While they 
are mentioned very often in the pre–Anti-Dühring period, this is less 
so after Anti-Dühring. One persistent concern (February 1873) is to 
rescue opposite pairs such as cause and effect or identity and differ-
ence from their metaphysical treatment (ibid., 5). Another (Summer 
1874) is to prove that, for example, a structure of polarization is pres-
ent in both physical nature and human thinking (ibid., 13). Engels’ 
examples, from mathematics and geometry to physics (November 
1875, February–July 1880), are well known (ibid., 41, 42, 48, 50, 189). 
As in the “1878 Plan,” they are ordinarily called “polar opposites” 
(polare Gegensätze). He also speaks of “interpenetration of opposites” 
(Durchdringung der Gegensätze) or “main opposites” (Hauptgegensätze) 
(ibid., 173, 175, 190, 225).
His approach to dialectics is much more straightforward. He con-
stantly speaks of “dialectical transitions” between natural spheres or 
categories (ibid., 5, 10, 28) or “dialectical relations” between opposites 
(ibid., 41, 190). Then we are also offered a group of definitions of 
dialectics: “dialectics of natural science: subject — matter in motion. 
Different forms and types of matter itself likewise known only through 
motion” (ibid., 9).13 “Dialectics, the so-called objective, prevails on 
entire nature and the s.c. subjective dialectics, the dialectical think-
ing, is only reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts 
itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the 
opposites and their final passage into one another” (Engels, 1987a, 
492, translation modified; 1985, 48). Alternatively, it is defined as “the 
science of the most general laws of all motion” (ibid., 147) or “science 
of universal interconnection” (ibid., 173, 175).
13 Grammatical irregularities here or elsewhere stem from Engels’ manuscript in German.
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Similar formulations have survived at least until the “1880 Plan,” 
when Engels (ibid., 183) changed the first axiom of his “1878 Plan” 
from dialectics to “motion in general,” followed by “attraction and 
repulsion transition of motion,” etc. He increasingly avoided any direct 
reference to, or usage of, his former dialectical terminology, and this 
remained more or less so until 1886.
In September 1879, Engels makes quite clear that he does not 
intend to “write a handbook of dialectics but only to prove that dia-
lectical laws are laws of development of nature, thus they apply to 
theoretical research of nature as well” (ibid., 176). His underlying 
thread, as he puts it (November 1877), is “systematization of natural 
sci[ences], which is now becoming more and more necessary.” Such 
a systematization “cannot be found in any other way than in the inter-
connections of phenomena themselves” (ibid., 144).
Already in 1874, Engels draws attention to an important distinc-
tion between natural scientific research and its unacknowledged reli-
ance on a certain theoretical thinking. “Natural scientists believe that 
they free themselves from philosophy by ignoring it or cursing at it.” 
They cannot, however, pursue science without employing scientific 
categories. Independent of whatever attitude towards philosophical 
theory they may hold, they are, and always will be, under the domi-
nation of philosophy. The only question is “whether they want to be 
dominated by a bad, fashionable philosophy or by a form of theoreti-
cal thinking which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought 
and its achievements” (Engels, 1987a, 491, translation modified; ibid., 
1985, 32).
In 1878, he describes his own enterprise as a contribution to 
bridging the divide between empirical sciences and philosophical 
theory (ibid., 167). The task he ascribes to dialectical philosophy is 
to articulate a solid theoretical basis of empirical natural science and 
corroborate some hypotheses formulated within the natural scien-
tific program. For more self-conscious theoretical guidance, natural 
sciences must turn to philosophy, or more specifically to dialectics: 
“it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form 
of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the 
analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolution-
ary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and 
transitions from one field of investigation to another” (Engels, 1987a, 
339; ibid., 1985, 167).
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To this end, Engels seems to have translated his dialectical termi-
nology into the language of natural sciences, when he writes (Decem-
ber 1885–January 1886) that “the unity of all motion in nature is no 
longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural scientific fact” (ibid., 
285). As he puts it elsewhere (February–July 1880), motion is “con-
ceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter” and 
it “comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, 
from mere change of place right up to thinking” (Engels, 1987a, 362; 
ibid., 1985, 187).
It goes without saying that Engels premises that motion is dia-
lectical because it is structured by the unity of opposites (identity/
difference). One ambiguity here is that he invests more and more 
time in investigating different forms of motion and their intercon-
nection in nature as well as their representations in natural scientific 
theories. I suspect that a closer consideration, and a more precise 
usage, of dialectical terminology became a secondary concern here. 
Although he repeatedly emphasizes that the capacity of philosophi-
cal theory has to be developed and improved and that a systematic 
reconsideration of previous dialectical philosophies (Ancient Greek 
and German Idealist) is a great need (ibid., 167), he leaves a series 
of questions open:
Is unity of opposites necessarily contradictory? To what extent 
are real contradictions dialectical and how are they distinguished 
from the way Hegel has interpreted dialectics? In which sense can we 
speak of a continuity of dialectical philosophy from Ancient Greeks 
to German Idealists?
In the next section, I will show that Engels was aware of a need for 
more scrutiny of such problems, but it is also doubtful that he intended 
to solve them as part and parcel of the program of Dialectics of Nature.
Engels’ Intentions and Open Questions
In Anti-Dühring, as I have already mentioned, Engels (1988, 318) 
asserts that “motion itself is contradiction.” This is followed by a more 
curious claim: “Even simple mechanical change of position can only 
come about through a body being at one and the same moment of 
time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the 
same place and also not in it” (Engels, 1987b, 111; ibid., 1988, 318). 
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I am afraid that the second claim neither supports nor explains the 
first one. It is very unlikely that he intends to speak against common 
sense here, for a body, at least in the sense of classical physics, can-
not be here and elsewhere at the same time. When writing these 
lines, he perhaps thought of his 1874 sketch on physical force where 
he describes transference of force from one body to another. When 
a body applies force to another one, the result is a “manifestation” 
(Äußerung) of force in the latter (Engels, 1985, 18). In this restricted 
sense it can be said of one entity that it is here and elsewhere at the 
same time, though in different forms.
Moreover, the formulation of “being in the same place and else-
where” probably originates from Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, or at 
least from Hegel’s interpretation of them, and the thesis “motion is 
contradiction” goes back to Heraclitus’ panta rhei (everything flows). 
Interestingly, Engels never borrows Parmenides’ idea again. Heracli-
tus’ panta rhei, by contrast, is reformulated many times. Engels prefers 
Hegel’s terminology in this regard and speaks of a “dialectical relation” 
between “identity and difference” (Engels, 1985, 41) or “difference within 
identity” (ibid., 15; see also ibid., 5, 17, 31–2, 225). One illustration of 
this is as follows (Engels, 1987a, 495; ibid., 1985, 14): “The plant, the 
animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself 
and becoming distinct from itself, by absorption and excreation of 
substances, by respiration, by cell formation and death of cells,” etc. 
But what could he have meant by the difference being in identity?
Common sense suggests that there is identity of things, but there 
is also change. Now the questions are these: 1) Why call them a contra-
diction? 2) Why are they dialectical? Engels might have easily answered 
the first question, but the second one less so: they are contradictory 
because opposites build a unity; and they are dialectical because Hegel 
calls them so. Unfortunately, both answers are unsatisfying. Dühring, 
for instance, calls them antagonistic and dialectical but not contradic-
tory. If Dühring’s terminology is not justified, then how can Engels’ 
be? And how can it be helpful to turn to Hegel’s authority in order 
to call them dialectical? Such problems demand a more elaborated 
approach. Given all the textual material we have today, Engels does 
not seem to have planned to go into detail on such matters. Neverthe-
less, I am curious about what his approach would have looked like if 
he had ever intended to solve such problems for us.
G4712.indd   231 3/1/2019   2:16:05 PM
232 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
Identity and Difference
Concerning the first question, he could have argued as follows. 
Consider a certain object with a bunch of properties including shape, 
color and weight in a certain place in a given unit of time. We would 
identify that object based on these properties. We usually identify 
objects in a very loose way by paying attention to a minimum of its 
properties. Identification in a rather strict sense would require a com-
plete list of all of its properties. This can be called the strict identity of 
an object. Now imagine a variation of at least one of its properties such 
as being in a different place or time, or having a different color. Given 
this change, the same object is not identical (in the strict sense) with 
its previous state, for the list of properties that makes up its previous 
identity has changed. In order to be strictly identical, both objects 
have to have all their properties in common. Obviously, this is not the 
case. From this angle, it is both the same object and it is not. Hence 
the contradiction. Now the problem is that since everything includ-
ing this object is in constant change, how can we identify anything in 
the first place? The Hegelian answer which Engels would embrace is 
that our concept of identity should encompass both a strict identity 
and change of that object. Accordingly, the concept of identity must 
allow a principle of change, which, in turn, results in the opposite of 
what that particular identity is. Identity as such contains both identity 
and non-identity.14
Historical Account of Dialectics
Contradiction and opposition as well as negation of negation 
apply to this formula. But are they also dialectical? Engels’ answer 
would be affirmative, because he thinks within the framework of, and 
ascribes dialectics to, Hegel’s philosophy. And this is where the prob-
lem gets complicated. What Engels terms “dialectics” is “speculation” 
in Hegel. But Engels, along with Marx, uses the term “speculation” 
not in the Hegelian but in the Kantian sense. This raises the follow-
ing question: how does Kant treat speculation and dialectics and what 
14 Sean Sayers would perhaps agree with this solution. In at least two articles (1980a; 1980b) 
he seems to approve Engels’ Hegelian formulations. However, he does not take Engels’ 
changing intentions into account, nor does he problematize Engels’ incomplete or failed 
attempts to develop a more elaborated approach to dialectics.
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impact does this have on configuring the relation between opposites 
and contradiction?
Engels (1987a, 342; ibid., 1985, 170) recommends to natural sci-
entists “the classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” but 
he also adds that “to study dialectics in the works of Kant would be a 
uselessly laborious and little-remunerative task, as there is now avail-
able, in Hegel’s works, a comprehensive compendium of dialectics.” 
Dialectics has so far been rather “fairly closely investigated by only two 
thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel” (1987a, 339; ibid., 1985, 167). This, of 
course, leads us to question Aristotle’s treatment of dialectical terms.
First of all, Aristotle is much closer to Kant than Engels thinks 
he is. And secondly, Engels ignores Aristotle’s hostility towards Zeno, 
Parmenides, and before them, Heraclitus. This complication is joined 
then by Hegel’s (1986a, 320) positive reception of Heraclitus: “there is 
no sentence of Heraclitus which I did not take into my Logic.” Hegel 
interprets Heraclitus’ “flux” as “becoming” (Werden), and its constitu-
ents as “unity of opposites” (Einheit Entgegengesetzter). Engels takes this 
up from Hegel and combines it with the natural scientific concept 
of motion. Fair enough. But where does Aristotle fit in this picture?
In Aristotle’s (1991, 1062a32–5) view, Heraclitus fails to admit that 
two opposite (antikeimena) claims concerning the same subject-matter 
cannot be simultaneously true. Aristotle is even more disturbed by Par-
menides and Zeno. Whereas Heraclitus defends contradictory state-
ments about reality, Parmenides and Zeno claim that logical descrip-
tions of real opposites inevitably give rise to contradictions. If one 
thing changes, they say, the result of that change cannot be identical 
with what has changed. And yet, it is the case that anything in motion 
or change is and is not at the same time (Plato, 1972, 138b7–c4).
In Physics, Book VI, Aristotle (1988, 239b5–240b8) offers a criti-
cism of Zeno, but he does not address any of the issues discussed in 
Plato’s Parmenides. He only contents himself with the remark that we 
can speak of change, say, from pale to non-pale without violating the 
law of exclusion of contradiction (ibid., 240a19–23). Ambiguously, he 
claims the opposite in Book V. There he writes that change from a 
non-entity to an entity or from non-pale to pale involves “contradic-
tion” (antiphasis) (ibid., 225a). Thus he locates contradiction within 
motion that goes through intermediate (metaxy) stages (ibid., 224b30).
If Engels speaks of an Aristotle–Hegel line, then he perhaps had 
in mind Aristotle’s view in Book V, and not Book VI. This would also 
G4712.indd   233 3/1/2019   2:16:05 PM
234 SCIENCE & SOCIETY
justify his ambition to exclude Kant from the historical line of dialec-
tics, as Kant is close to Aristotle of Book VI, when Kant distinguishes 
different types of oppositions. Kant basically says that any logical oppo-
sition is contradictory. However, there are real oppositions and they 
are not contradictory, for contradiction strictly belongs to mental 
faculties and it has nothing to do with reality. A third type is the dia-
lectical opposition that is neither real nor logical. This type rather 
originates from a cognitive operation of human reason that directs 
itself to certain mental objects such as the absolute and unconditional. 
Such mental objects are structured by opposites, but they create an 
illusion as if they exist in reality. Accordingly, two opposite claims 
can be asserted of the same object. They can both be wrong without 
contradicting each other. Hence non-real dialectical opposites (Kant, 
2016b, B 532; Kant, 2016a, 339; Wolff, 1980, 341; Arndt, 2009, 103–4).
When Engels speaks of dialectical opposites that are real and 
contradictory, he then refers to Hegel, rather than to the Greeks or 
Kant. However, the difference between Hegel and Engels is that the 
former views real contradictions as externalization or manifestation 
of logical contradictions in nature, while the latter reverses this line of 
reasoning in the sense that any real structure such as physical motion 
finds its equivalent in, and is expressed by, what the classical logic 
used to term “contradiction.” The other difference is the meaning 
of dialectics in Hegel.
In Hegel’s understanding, the old or rather “usual” kind of dialec-
tics is the case when two opposite predicates are asserted of the same 
subject. The “more pure dialectical” form appears when one predicate 
simultaneously refers to itself and to its opposite. This is a contradic-
tion (Hegel, 1986c, 56). Opposites in isolation are “abstract.” If they 
are differentiated from, and related to, one another, they embody “the 
dialectical” in their “transition.” The “speculative” as a higher stage of 
this line of thinking results from the “unity of determinations within 
their opposition” (Einheit der Bestimmungen in ihrer Entgegensetzung) 
(Hegel, 1986b, 176). For example, conceiving of identity and differ-
ence as separate entities applies to the “abstract” account. A transition 
from identity to difference would express the dialectical moment. That 
the transition of identity to difference returns to the identity itself 
is what speculation is about. Reconstructing the successive stages of 
such a mental operation is the business of Hegel’s “method” (Hegel, 
1986d, 553–4). Note here that Hegel never speaks of a “dialectical 
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method,” for dialectics is a temporary moment, and not the final result, 
of reconstruction of the contradictory unity of opposites.
When Engels (1985, 239) speaks of “the amazing aprioristic specu-
lations of German natural philosophy,” he seems to be using the term 
“speculation” in a typical Kantian sense. Speculative knowledge is 
the opposite of natural knowledge, for the latter, unlike the former, 
is based on, and investigates, empirical objects (Kant, 2016a, 559). 
Despite the fact that Engels uses the term in the Kantian sense, he 
objects to a strict separation of empirical and non-empirical knowledge 
of natural science. This gives rise to more questions than the problems 
Engels has believed he has solved. Engels seems to have achieved some 
of his goals in his pursuit of philosophy and theoretical natural science. 
Nevertheless, he does not seem have planned to offer a more direct 
and systematic approach that takes the aforementioned ambiguities 
into account. This points not only at his incomplete intentions but 
also registers some limits of his dialectics.
Alternative Dialectics of Nature
Depending on how dialectics, opposition and contradiction are 
used, one can derive different meanings from a dialectics of nature 
that do not necessarily coincide with how it was conceptualized by 
Engels. Following the aforementioned illustrations, one can think of 
three alternative accounts:
Aristotle: There are real opposites in nature. They are neither 
contradictory nor dialectical, for contradictions arise from logical 
errors or difference of opinions in academic disputes. Dialectics, as it 
was coined by the Ancient Greeks, applies to an interpretational act of 
disproving counter-arguments of the opponent. As far as his Physics, 
Book V is concerned, one can add that unity and interconnection of 
opposites are contradictions. This, however, does not correspond to 
the opposite claim in Book VI that there is no such thing as a real 
contradiction. On the terrain of what Hegel and Engels used to call 
subjective dialectics, Aristotle links dialectics to opposites and contra-
diction. That he asserts that there are real opposites and contradic-
tions in nature does not indicate that they are also dialectical. If he 
had spoken of a dialectics of nature, this would have been limited to 
the interpretation of, and dispute over, nature, without any further 
claim of an objective dialectics in nature.
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Kant: In a similar vein, Kant claims that there are real opposites 
that are neither contradictory nor dialectical. In comparison to Aris-
totle, Kant is less ambiguous in that he rules out real contradictions, 
for they apply to logical oppositions only. But this does not make 
them necessarily dialectical. In other words, logical oppositions are 
subject to contradictions, but not all logical oppositions are dialecti-
cal. Kant could have spoken of a dialectics of nature, though not in 
the sense that there are real opposites in nature. A Kantian dialectics 
of nature would arise from metaphysical assertions of  conditionality–
unconditionality or absolute–relative, which the human mind proj-
ects into nature. The illusion that metaphysical opposites do actually 
exist in nature independent of the human mind is what Kant calls 
dialectical. If there is a dialectics of nature, it would apply to this 
metaphysical confusion of the concept of nature.
Hegel: There are real and logical oppositions and contradictions. 
Opposites are structural elements of contradictions. Opposites that 
are not unified remain opposites; those that are unified constitute a 
contradiction. For Hegel, the aspect of negativity or exclusion refers to 
dialectics, that of positive and negative or unity of opposites to specula-
tion. This idea is first formulated in his Logic as a logical self-description 
of how scientific thinking proceeds. Since nature is a manifestation 
of this logic, it necessarily follows that there are oppositions and con-
tradictions in nature. If Hegel had a dialectics of nature, it would 
have referred to a) dialectics in nature in the sense that negativity of 
pure opposites applies to particular natural phenomena that develop 
towards contradiction; or b) dialectics of  nature in the sense that logic 
and nature are non-contradictory opposites before  logic externalizes 
itself into nature. After  that externalization, one can speak of specula-
tion, not dialectics, of nature.
What Engels would have said of these alternatives is open to inter-
pretation. With his new 1880 plan where dialectics is replaced by 
motion, he would have hardly bothered with a broad discussion of 
these alternatives. We know at least that the textual material from the 
pre-1880 stage, or more specifically the 1874–78 period, provides a 
more coherent picture. He would probably agree with Aristotle and 
Kant that there are logical and real opposites. Nevertheless, he would 
side here with Hegel: opposites are of dynamic nature and develop 
towards contradiction. While contradictions are speculative for Hegel, 
they are dialectical for Engels. He also downplays Hegel’s idealism 
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in the sense that nature is not a manifestation of logic, but rather 
logic mirrors nature. With this claim, he would be on the same page 
with Hegel that logic and nature are dialectical opposites in Hegel’s 
sense of the term. Since there are real opposites and contradictions 
in nature, Engels would have said that dialectics applies to nature. In 
this regard, he is in full accord with Hegel’s dialectics in nature in spite 
of Hegel’s different usage of the term. While existence of real con-
tradictions would prove for Hegel that speculation applies to nature, 
Engels would assert for the same reason that it proves that dialectics, 
not speculation, applies to nature. Concerning Hegel’s dialectics of 
nature, Engels would perhaps speak of an opposition between the 
definition of a concept (i.e., dialectics, opposition, contradiction) 
and the reality to which this concept applies. Although the two-sided 
relation between concept and reality might be viewed as a polar opposi-
tion or two extreme sides of the same relation, they do not necessarily 
indicate a contradiction. Given the provisional distinction between 
dialectics of  and in nature above, or alternative connections between 
dialectics and nature/natural science, the one-sidedness of the past 
titles given to Engels’ book is quite obvious, for they disregard not only 
Engels’ changing intentions or incomplete contentions on dialectics, 
but also his potential responses to alternative conceptualizations of 
dialectics of nature. This is then complicated by Kedrov’s distaste for 
a dialectical ontology of nature and epistemological preference for 
dialectics of natural science (not nature). All in all, the complexity 
of the application problem of dialectics as in dialectics of, in and and 
nature is doubled by the relation of dialectics of, in and and natural 
science. Neither Engels nor his commentators, let alone Marx, are 
conclusive here. I believe this ambiguity is a good point of departure 
for further debate.
Conclusion: Revisiting the Old Debate
In this article, I first peeled off the interpretational and editorial 
layers of the Engels debate. Then I broke down Engels’ arguments 
concerning his dialectics as it is related to, and distinguished from, 
past dialectical philosophies. Unlike a great majority of the former 
accounts in the Engels debate, my guiding thread remains Engels’ 
intentions, incomplete or otherwise. This sort of perspective does not 
promise to solve problems of Engels’ dialectics, but it provides us with 
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a better set of questions. In other words, it makes the problematic 
relation between the author’s intentions and his texts, the uneasy com-
munication between his ideas and his readers’ reactions as well as the 
editorial impacts on the creation of an author’s image, more visible. 
Having said this, I would like to revisit the old debate one more time.
One of Engels’ central concerns is certainly the application of 
dialectics to nature. However, he is rather at pains to prove that dia-
lectics applies to reality in general. In this sense, he does not “follow” 
Hegel per se  since he does not adopt a fixed categorial system (Lukács) 
and project it into nature (Hook, Lewis). He is primarily interested in 
natural scientific verification of Hegel’s dialectical hypotheses.
This vision does not seem to have changed much throughout his 
entire project. Despite the terminological instability in different stages of 
his work, a shift from a Hegelian to a natural scientific Engels (Stepanov) 
is hardly the case. The textual material allows us to conclude that different 
aspects of dialectics, including a philosophical theory of totality, a method 
of thinking and a certain structure formed in reality were examined 
within the framework of the philosophy of nature, logic and natural sci-
ences (Deborin). But this barely suggests that the project is more about 
a dialectics of the natural sciences than a dialectics of nature (Kedrov).
It is open to debate whether there can be a limited list of dialecti-
cal laws (Sartre). What we know is that Engels did not assume them 
from the very beginning but rather induced his laws post-factum  from 
an intensive study of contemporary natural sciences. In 1880, he curi-
ously dropped this idea, and shifted his focus to one key word: motion.
It is questionable whether Engels was keen to invent a theory of 
everything, even if he asserted the universality of dialectics (Schmidt, 
Lichtheim, Carver). It was clear to him that there is motion and it is 
everywhere, a concept which applies to nature, society and thought. 
Accordingly, the question concerning the validity of dialectics was 
closely connected to whether motion itself is something contradictory 
and dialectical (Vigier). I am not aware of any passage where Marx 
discusses this issue. However, Marx and Engels agree with Hegel that 
the dialectical relation of quality and quantity apply both to nature and 
society (Hoffman, Stanley, Zimmermann). Calling elliptical motion 
of planets a contradiction is also an idea they share (Weston, Kangal).
Naturally, editorial approaches have always been influenced 
by, and had a further impact on, such debates. Different choices 
of titles and rearrangements of the manuscripts reflect all of the 
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political–philosophical concerns. To this extent, various decisions 
regarding the presentation of Engels’ text are equally justified. None-
theless, Engels’ changing intentions throughout the work, the insta-
bility of his terminology and the incomplete character of his project 
allow an alternative title, such as “Philosophical–Natural Scientific 
Manuscripts.” Its similarity to the title given to Marx’ 1844 Manuscripts 
is obvious. But no one seems to have considered this option.
Regardless of what Engels could or should have said more than he 
already did, I think we must take the limitations of his achievements 
more seriously. If some scholars tend to view incompleteness as a sign 
of weakness, they are oblivious to the fact that incompleteness has an 
enabling rather than disabling effect on scientific progress. We know 
at least that this is how Engels thought scientific progress works. There 
is no reason why Engels’ own work should be exempted from it.
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